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I. Introduction
Despite the antics of many policy makers, economists, and journalists,
climate change is not a new phenomenon. In fact, Earth’s climate has changed
many times throughout our planet’s relatively young history. In the last 650,000
years there have been seven cycles of climate change, which can formally be
defined as the encompassing process of glacial advance and retreat (T.C. Peterson
2009). The last climate change ended 7,000 years ago, finalizing the last “ice age”
and marking the beginning of the modern climate era and human civilization.
While climate change is cyclical and an innate process to Earth, the current
warming trends our planet faces now are not. Rather in the past 1,300 years, the
amount of global warming (climate change) is proceeding at an unprecedented
rate (T.C. Peterson 2009). The exact cause for this deviation from Earth’s regular,
homeostatic cycle can readily be attributed to the heat-trapping nature of carbon
dioxide and other gases that have become more abundant in our atmosphere than
normal. While the media and corporations who stand to lose revenues from
accepting climate change may paint a highly uncertain scientific consensus on
climate change, this is far from the truth (Kellstedt et al. 2008). As the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) proclaims, “Scientific
evidence for warming of the climate system is unequivocal” (Oreskes 2004).
The visual and tangible evidence for climate change is compelling. Global
sea levels have risen 17 centimeters (6.7 inches) in the past century, a rate that has
doubled in the last decade; glaciers are retreating in the Alps, Himalayas, Andes,
and Rocky Mountain ranges; the number of recorded high temperature extreme
weather events has increased considerably since the 1950’s; and most of all,
global temperatures have continued to rise: ten of the warmest years since 1880
have been in the past twelve years, even in the face of an unusually deep solar
minimum from 2007-2009 (Allison et al. 2009). Not only does climate change
pass the eye test, but so too through computer models and the scrutinous scientific
process. Accurate models have confirmed that climate change is occurring and
faster than natural, cyclical processes intend for (Houghton 1995).
Naturally when a problem arises, an instigator should be sought out for its
cause. After shuffling around the truth for many years, the scientific community
has come to a firm understanding that we are to blame. That the human beings
who inhabit this planet, use its resources, and live day in and day out are
unequivocally responsible for the current global climate change trends. Obviously
when the general population was accused of this, many fired back with harsher
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accusations. But the scientific community stands firm and in consensus. The
IPCC explicitly states “Human activities … are modifying the concentration of
atmospheric constituents … that absorb or scatter radiant energy. … Most of the
observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase
in greenhouse gas concentrations” (Oreskes 2004). And the IPCC is not alone in
its conclusions. The National Academy of Sciences, the American Meteorological
Society, the American Geophysical Union, and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science all have issued statements in recent years concluding
that the evidence for human activities modifying Earth’s climate is compelling.
To further demonstrate scientific consensus, 928 abstracts published in
refereed scientific journals between 1993 and 2003 and listed in the ISI database
with the keywords “climate change” were analyzed. Of those papers, 75% either
explicitly or implicitly accepted the human processes theory of accelerated
climate change, while 25% took no position; none of these papers disagreed with
the human processes position (Oreskes 2004). Despite the overwhelming
evidence, the general public believes climate change to be a moderate risk issue at
best (Leiserowitz 2006). Politicians place climate change low on their agendas
and comedians mock those who believe in climate change. But why does our
population refuse to listen to the potentially life threatening presence of climate
change?
This paper examines the lack of awareness and feelings of personal
responsibility for climate change. Using a survey, we examine the demographics
and personal factors most important in eliciting awareness for climate change, and
furthermore, personal responsibility for its effects. Finally, we examine how an
individual's’ beliefs regarding the effects and cause of climate change shape their
sense of awareness and responsibility. Results show that for this sample,
particular demographics, the timeframe of when the impacts will accrue to the
respondents, the differences between when respondents will feel impacts
personally and when others will, and the likelihood of severe weather being
caused by climate change are significant in determining if an individual feels
responsible for climate change. These results have broader implications since
those who feel responsible for climate change often take more action than those
who do not. While the sample of respondents limits the applicability of our study,
further studies may be used to target campaigns for awareness and education of
climate change. Hopefully, this will increase the total number of individuals who

https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/jerec/vol2/iss1/4

2

Clancy and Solomon: A Survey on Climate Change: How Beliefs Shape Responsibility

feel responsible for the effects of climate change and cause more people to take
action.
II. Literature Review
A multitude of studies have examined individuals’ knowledge and beliefs
regarding climate change. Kellstedt et. al (2008) were compelled to study climate
change preferences because despite the increase in scientific consensus regarding
climate change, the media portrays climate change as a debate. While media
portrayal of climate change being skewed was common knowledge, Kellstedt et.
al conducted a survey to look more closely at public informedness along with
confidence in scientists and personal efficacy. Interestingly enough, the analysis
of this survey shows that with an increase in knowledge or “informedness”
regarding climate change, individuals felt less responsible and showed less
concern for the issue. This paradox led us to consider the role of responsibility in
risk perception and beliefs regarding climate change in the United States.
Climate change is associated with abstract images and because of this,
utility maximizing individuals are unable to absorb how dangerous it is
(Leiserowitz 2006). Despite high awareness, climate change remains a low
priority issue in the United States (Leiserowitz 2005). The fact that climate
change remains so low on the United States’ political agenda may speak to the
fact that America is in a wishful thinking state (Leiserowitz 2006). This means
that because Americans’ cannot always see the impacts of climate change, they
believe it is irrelevant to them to try and fix it. Furthermore, Americans’ believe
that the impacts of climate change accrue to others and occur far in the future
(Leiserowitz 2005). Because of this, individuals adopt the mindset that climate
change is “not their problem” and because the effects of climate change currently
aren’t drastic enough to illicit feelings of concern or responsibility in the United
States, people refrain from action.
Public risk perceptions shape the type of action, political, social or
economic that is taken and therefore are imperative to mitigating the effects of
climate change (Leiserowitz 2005). Due to the standing of climate change in the
United States as a moderate risk issue, it remains low on our national
environmental priority list. Global warming was ranked twelfth out of thirteen
national environmental issues faced by Americans (Dunlap and Saad 2001 as
cited by Leiserowitz 2006). Leiserowitz notes that despite being concerned and
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aware of climate change, Americans deem climate change less important than
nearly all other environmental issues facing our nation.
We believe that United States’ citizens lack of responsibility for climate
change on the individual level contributes to the low/moderate priority nature of
this issue within the country. Because of this we decided to create a study based
on Leiserowitz’ (2014) study conducted as a part of the Yale Project on Climate
Change Communication which looks at beliefs, attitudes, risk perception and
values regarding climate change. In order to adapt their survey for our research,
we chose to include factors such as responsibility, who will be impacted the most
heavily by climate change and beliefs on some of the likely impacts of climate
change. Our study aims to provide the data necessary to assess how various
beliefs regarding climate change, and the perceived risks of climate change, shape
one’s sense of responsibility for the issue. This will contribute to the existing
literature by determining whether or not personal responsibility is a critical
element in raising the perceived risk of climate change in the United States.
III. Respondent Characteristics and Initial Findings
In order to test our research question, we formulated a survey that would
capture beliefs on climate change, its causes, impacts, and potential solutions, as
well as demographic information. Questions about beliefs on climate change
covered respondents’ familiarity to the issue and how serious they felt climate
change was to themselves, the United States, and their community. The section on
beliefs about climate change’s causes, impacts, and solutions sought respondents’
beliefs of if climate change was caused by natural or human processes, what
contributes to causing climate change, which factor impacted climate change the
most, and if they felt personally responsible for causing climate change. Finally,
the survey was rounded out with demographic questions about risk preference,
education, employment, gender, age, income bracket, political views, and risk
preferences. Surveys to collect data were administered by members of Colby
College Economics classes EC231 and EC476 during the last week of March
2015 and first week of April 2015. Surveys were taken at locations ranging from
Austin, Texas to Washington D.C. to right here at Colby College, with all
occurring in the time range from 8am to 11pm (local time). In total, we collected
345 responses, which had significant demographic trends.
The gender distribution of our respondents was fairly equal with 54%
identifying as male and 46% of respondents identifying as female (Figure 1).
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However, most of these respondents were undergraduate and graduate college
students aged 18-25. The only other sizable age demographic in our respondent
pool was ages 50-59, most likely representing parents of the surveyors from
Colby College classes EC231 and EC476 (Figure 2).
Figure 1

Figure 2

The age distribution of our sample could explain a highly educated and
employed pool. Approximately 51% of respondents reported having a Bachelor’s,
Graduate, or Professional Degree; another 42% responded with only having a
high school degree, however this statistic most likely contains the large number of
college aged students who are highly educated but still currently enrolled in
school (Figure 3). In terms of employment, only 4 respondents are unemployed
meaning that nearly 98% of our sample is either a student or working part or fulltime (Figure 4).
Figure 3
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Not only does our sample represent the upper echelon of education and
employment in society, but they also represent the top of wealth in the United
States. 166 respondents characterized their approximate household income as
equal to or greater than $100,000 (Figure 5). This statistic most likely is inflated
with the household incomes of parents from Colby College surveyors.
Nevertheless, this statistic further demonstrates the affluence of our sample,
which should be taken into account when analyzing our data and thinking about
applying this proportion to the greater United States population.
The two final demographics complement each other well. Figure 6 shows political
views ranging from Very Liberal to Very Conservative. This distribution is
skewed slightly right, centering between moderate and very liberal. Figure 7
shows risk preferences. This distribution is skewed right, centering on a sample
that identifies as particularly risky. These demographics mirror each other well as
more liberal respondents usually have riskier mindsets (Carney 2008).
Figure 5

Figure 6
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The demographic characteristics of our sample lead well into initial
findings on respondents’ beliefs about climate change. From our raw data, we find
that respondents are extremely aware of climate change. In fact only, 5% of
respondents declared they were not familiar with the issue of climate change
(Figure 8). Furthermore, 87% of respondents accurately believe that climate
change is changing, regardless of the cause (Figure 9). However when quantifying
how familiar respondents are with climate change, only 39% identify as having
expert or very high familiarity while 47% claim to have moderate levels of
familiarity (Figure 10). So while many understand climate change on the surface,
many do not feel they are truly educated on the issue.
Figure 8

Figure 9

Figure 10

Despite not feeling informed about climate change to the point of calling
oneself an expert or very familiar, nearly all respondents correctly believe that
human activity is responsible for the rapid increase of climate change effects;
56% of respondents feel climate change is mainly caused by human activity and
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another 35% believe climate change is partly caused by natural processes and
partly caused by human activities (Figure 11). While this last group is not
completely correct in their beliefs, they are correct is realizing natural processes
are not the only factor contributing to the effects of modern climate change.
Figure 11

Correct sentiments on climate change can further be seen in respondents’
beliefs on the causes of climate change. When asked to rank the extent to which
harsher winters, higher temperatures, extreme weather, and other factors shown
below would be caused by climate change, respondents felt that climate change
would be likely to very likely in causing those factors (Figures 12-22). This data
demonstrates that although respondents may not believe they are completely
informed about climate change, they have internalized its effects.
Figure 12
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Figure 14

Figure 15

Figure 16

Figure 17

Figure 18

Figure 19
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Figure 20

Figure 21

Figure 22

However, while respondents believe they are aware of climate change and
demonstrated correct beliefs on its causes, respondents deviated from scientific
proof in their beliefs on climate change when in relation to different entities. From
Figures 23-26, our sample demonstrated that respondents believe climate change
is in fact a serious issue for the world and United States, as there were very low
rates of selections for options of “not serious at all” and “not very serious.”
However, while respondents believe this, they don’t rate the seriousness of
climate change for themselves personally or their community nearly as high; 37%
of respondents don’t see climate change as serious for themselves personally in
comparison to only 8% for the for world. This data matches previous literature
that individuals see climate change as an issue that is serious, but not serious to
their immediate surroundings; that they are somewhat impenetrable to the effects
of climate change, an obviously false belief.
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Figure 23

Figure 24

Figure 25

Figure 26

Furthermore, our data matches previous literature that not only do
individuals feel climate change is not an issue for them personally, but also that it
won’t be affecting them now; rather than climate change is an issue for future
generations to deal with. Based on Figures 27-30, at least 65% of respondents feel
that the world, United States, and communities feel the effects of climate change
now or in the next 5-10 years, respectively. However, this belief does not translate
to personal feelings as only 34% of respondents believe climate change’s impacts
will be felt now or in the near future, while 56% felt that climate change would
affect Earth in 10-50 years.
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Figure 27

Figure 28

Figure 29

Figure 30

An explanation for these wrongly held beliefs that climate change will
affect our planet but not necessarily the individual, nor the individual during the
present time, could be linked to how responsible respondents feel personally for
climate change. Based upon Figure 31, only 18% of respondents feel extremely or
very responsible for climate change while 82% of respondents feel only
somewhat, not very, or not at all responsible for climate change. So while
respondents are aware of the issue and know a fair amount about it, they don’t
feel that the effects of climate change will hit them personally. Furthermore,
although respondents understand that climate change is in fact being influenced
primarily by human processes (Figure 11), they do not feel personally responsible
for those effects.
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Figure 31

IV. Methods and Results
In order to determine relationships between personal responsibility, beliefs
and demographic data, we needed to create a simple linear regression. After
running an initial “kitchen sink” regression with many of our variables, we
realized that we needed to transform our data in order to get more meaningful and
accurate results. Because our survey was somewhat repetitive and asked similar
questions in different ways in order to elicit how specific changes effected
respondents beliefs, many of our questions were related and prompted similar
responses. In our survey, we looked at how serious climate change was for
respondents personally, for their communities, for the country and for the world.
In order to make these questions more meaningful, we generated three new
variables subtracting beliefs of the severity of climate change personally from
how serious respondents felt climate change was to the world, the country and the
community. From this we could understand the differences in how serious
respondents believed climate change to be for themselves and for others. When
looking through our initial findings, we found that respondents believed the
impacts of climate change would accrue to the world, country and community
around the same time. Because of this we decided to create a variable containing
the average of the community, country and world timeline variables. We then
generated a new variable by subtracting respondents’ perception of when the
impacts of climate change would accrue to them personally from the average of
when they believed the impacts of climate change would accrue to the
community, country and world. We also included their personal impact timeline
because those results were so varied from the other three. Our survey included a
small grid containing some of the possible results of climate change within the
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categories of severe weather and socio-political unrest. We asked respondents to
rate how likely they believed climate change would cause each of those impacts.
Because many of the questions were related within each of those categories, we
decided to combine the related questions into binary variables for socio-political
unrest and severe weather. Respondents were to rate their beliefs on a scale of 15 with 5 being the belief that the impact would very likely be caused by climate
change. With respect to climate change causing severe weather, we decided that
if respondents had a total value of 32 or more for that section, meaning they chose
very likely for most of the impacts, the variable would be a 1, and if the total
value was less than 32, the severe weather variable would be a 0. For the
sociopolitical unrest binary variable, if the summation of the respondent’s
answers were below 15, the variable would be equal to 0, and if it was above 15,
the variable would be equal to 1. With these new variables, we formed the
following regression:
Equation 1:
Responsibility=ᵝ0+ᵝ1degree_of_familiarity+ᵝ2is_the_climatechanging+ᵝ3per
sonal_impact_timeline+ᵝ4diff_ave_impact_timeline+ᵝ5severity_world_personal_di
ff+ᵝ6severity_US_personal_diff+ᵝ7severity_community_personal_diff+ᵝ8bin_socio
political_unrest+ᵝ9bin_severe_weather+ᵝ10belief_causes_cc+ᵝ11risk+ᵝ12education+ᵝ
13gender+ᵝ14age+ᵝ15political_spectrum+ᵋ
The R2 for this regression was .331 meaning that 33.1% of the variation in
sentiments of responsibility were explained by our regression. The regression
produced
6
variables
of
statistical
significance,
those
being
personal_impact_timeline,
diff_ave_impact_timeline,
bin_severe_weather,
belief_causes_cc, risk and age. The following conclusions can be drawn from
these results: people take more responsibility if they believe climate change will
impact them personally in the near future with an increase in the personal impact
timeline variable causing a .52 increase in sentiments of responsibility. This is
significant at the 1% level. On average people believe that climate change will
affect others (the community, country and world) before they are affected by
climate change themselves. This result in statistically significant at the 1% level
as well. Respondents who believe that severe weather would likely be an impact
of climate change felt more responsible for climate change. This result was
drawn from the binary variable for severe weather and is statistically significant at
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the 10% level. Respondents took more responsibility for climate change if they
felt it was caused primarily by humans. This result was statistically significant at
the 10% level of significance. Respondents who labeled themselves as “risk
takers” were less likely to take responsibility for climate change which was
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Finally, the older
respondents were, the less likely they were to take personal responsibility for
climate change, a result that was statistically significant at the 5% level of
significance.
In order to determine the validity of our data and ensure that we did not
have any econometric errors, we ran the following tests: Ramsey’s RESET test
for omitted variables, the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity as well as
looking at the variance inflation factors. In the Ramsey’s RESET test we found
that we could not reject the null that the model had no omitted variables, meaning
that there was no omitted variables bias in our model. From the Breusch-Pagan
test we were able to prove that we could not reject the null of constant variance,
meaning heteroskedasticity was not a problem. Finally, after analyzing the
variance inflation factors, we found that none of the variables had VIFs above 5.5,
which is well below the normal threshold of 10 and proved that our variables were
likely uncorrelated with one another. With this, we were satisfied with our
regression and chose to examine it by education level.
By looking at histograms of respondents’ education levels for our data, we
were able to split the dataset into highly educated and less educated respondents.
We then reran this regression for each of these categories. The results of our
original regression alongside the education breakup can be seen in Table 1 below.
The low education sample had an R2 of .327 and the high education sample had an
R2 of .449.
In the low education sample, respondents take more responsibility if they
believe the impacts of climate change will affect them sooner. This is positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level. Similarly, they believe that the
impacts of climate change will affect others before it affects them. This is
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Respondents
who believed climate change would cause sociopolitical unrest felt less
responsible for climate change. This result is negative and statistically significant
at the 5% level of significance. Finally, respondents who believed that severe
weather will be a likely impact of climate change felt more responsible for
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climate change. This result was statistically significant at the 10% level of
significance.
In the higher education sample, respondents who identified as more
familiar with climate change felt less personally responsible for climate change.
This result was statistically significant at the 1% level of significance.
Respondents in this group felt more responsibility for climate change the sooner
they thought they would feel the impacts and felt that other groups (the
community, world and country) would feel the effects of climate change before
they would individually. Both of these results were statistically significant at the
1% level of significance. People in this group who identified as “risk takers” felt
less responsible for climate change, a result that was significant at the 5% level of
significance. Finally, in this group males were more likely to take responsibility
for climate change than females were. This result was significant at the 10% level
of significance.
Table 1:
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V. Discussion
While there were differences when looking at our survey sample as a
whole and broken down between high and low education groups, we found many
variables in each sample that were consistent with results from prior studies that
we reviewed. Across all three samples, the personal impact timeline and the
difference between respondents personal impact timeline and the average impact
timeline for others (the world, country and community) were positive and
statistically significant. This is very similar to the literature in that normally,
studies show that climate change is considered an issue that is not personal but
one that affects other people, and that will not occur in the near future. Our
results show that individuals believe the impacts of climate change will accrue to
others before themselves. We also find that the sooner respondents think the
impacts of climate change will affect them, the more responsible they will feel for
the issue. While those were the only two variables consistent across all three
samples, many of the statistically significant variables found across all of the
samples mirrored findings from other similar studies as well. As expected, in our
main effects model, we found that respondents feel more responsible for climate
change when they believe humans cause it. Respondents also took less
responsibility for climate change as age increase and as their self-perceived
riskiness increased. If respondents felt that climate change would likely cause
severe weather, they took more responsibility for the matter. All of these findings
were expected and of the correct sign. Ultimately, given that many of our results
mirror the results of prior studies and research such as those conducted by
Leiserowitz (2005, 2006) and Kellstedt (2008), we can conclude that despite our
skewed sample demographics, our survey did produce meaningful and sensical
results for our sample.
VI. Conclusion
Our findings support and build on previous literature, demonstrating that
not enough Americans feel responsible for the effects of climate change, despite
unequivocal scientific evidence. Despite having an imperfect and non-random
sample as evidenced in the initial findings section, our study does provide results
worthy for continued pursuit. Based on our results that our sample does not feel
personally responsible for climate change, a next question to explore could be
centered on the methods that would change those sentiments. Perhaps another
survey modeled after this one could determine why Americans do not feel
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personally responsible and could be used in conjunction with our study to support
policy action in a certain direction.
Since our study does find that our highly affluent and educated sample is
very aware of climate change, another application off of our study could be to
determine respondents’ willingness to pay to stop the effects of climate change
through a choice experiment. Although our study finds respondents believing
climate change’s effects will accrue in the future, being able to measure specific
monetary amounts could aid policy makers in determining how they could price
conservation efforts.
In summary, although our study does provide interesting and thought
provoking results, more work must be done in a study with more resources
available in order to provide results that may be applied broadly and produce
information that could lead to durable and lasting change.
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